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Abstract 
 
Although rolling back of globalization is feasible, the author contends that techno-economic 
forces will ensure its further expansion. The world economy will be more integrated tomorrow 
than today. Increasing number of countries and policy mandarins have begun to see the welfare 
effects of globalization and the constituency for it much larger than that against it. However, 
capitalizing from it is a challenge because globalization does entail some downside risks. This 
paper focuses on macroeconomic challenges emanating from the on-ward march of 
globalization. In the recent past, it has been observed that several globalizing economies suffered 
from volatility. Therefore, the author devotes a large part of this research to the vexing issue of 
volatility and how to manage it.  
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1 Introduction 
In the wake of the Seattle ministerial of the WTO, globalization as a concept has acquired 
considerable emotive force.  It has fervent supporters and equally harsh critics. Little wonder 
then that it does not have a widely accepted definition. The term is used as a portmanteau -- as 
license for description, analysis, approval, and abuse.  Accordingly, the surrounding literature is 
multidisciplinary at best, confused at worst.  
 
Economists are as divided as anyone over this topic.  Many of those affiliated with international 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization incline to view global economic integration enhances individual welfare and 
generally believe that economies that integrate have better prospects for economic development. 
Their assessment is founded on the neoclassical presumption that market allocations are more 
efficient in a globally integrated world.2 
 
In contrast, independent analysts (along with not a few international civil servants) question 
whether the globalization of trade and finance is an engine of growth.  The foundations of 
economic growth (good government, the construction of a civil society, the institutions that 
facilitate the accumulation of human and physical capital) are built at home, they argue, and a 
development strategy concerned only to promote international trade and investment can be a 
dangerous diversion from this more fundamental task (Rodrik 2001). They warn of worrisome 
implications for the ability of societies to manage economic change.  They point to alarming 
trends in the distribution of income.  They emphasize the associated rise in financial volatility 
and economic insecurity, highlighting the emerging-market crises of the 1990s and the political 
turmoil that followed in their wake.   
 
Any attempt to sort through these issues requires being clear and explicit on what we are talking 
about.  For present purposes we define globalization as the extension beyond national borders of 
the same market forces that have operated for centuries at national and subnational levels.  A 
more elaborate definition would distinguish the extension beyond national borders of markets in 
                                                           
2 Studies making the case that globalization is associated with growth include Dollar (1992), Ben-Davis (1993), Lee 
(1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Harrison (1996), Wacziarg (1998) and Edwards (1998).   
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goods and services (including capital services), on the one hand, from the adaptation of the 
national and sub-national economies, on the other. It would develop the following points.3  
Globalization promotes a tendency for firms and other market participants to think, plan, operate, 
and invest for the future with global and not merely local opportunities in mind. While declining 
costs of transportation and communication are integral to this process, the principal driver is set 
of conscious policies, at the national and international levels, aimed at promoting the 
liberalization of international investment and trade.   
 
So much for preliminaries. We proceed now to a more detailed look at the historical background 
and then the effects. 
 
2 Facets of Globalization 
The contemporary world trading system, which can trace its origins to the proposal to found an 
International Trade Organization after World War II and the negotiation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is now half a century old. At the time of genesis in 1947, the 
GATT agreement was signed by 23 nations. 62 countries participated in the Kennedy Round 
(1964-67), 102 in the Tokyo Round (1973-79) and 123 in the Uruguay Round (1968-94). The 
WTO was established in 1995.4 As of July 2001, the WTO had 142 members, with additional 26 
countries waiting in the wings (Das, 2001). The WTO’s political and legal base is broader than 
that of the GATT. While the WTO inherited all the MTN related knowledge and decisions of the 
GATT, its obligations are applicable to a much larger share of global trade. The WTO has 
consolidated various provisions of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) that existed under 
the GATT and made it more cohesive and efficient. In addition, membership of the WTO is 
larger than that of the GATT, particularly the developing economies are much better represented 
in the new system. The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) provides regular 
monitoring of trade policies of the member economies, while the biennial ministerial provides 
political leaders an opportunity to review the work of the WTO and provide it with necessary 
redirection.  
                                                           
3 Henderson (1999) has posited a definition along these lines. 
4 The Marrakesh Agreement was formally adopted on 15 April 1994 and the WTO was born on the 1st of January 
1995. Its annual budget is approximately $90 million and total personnel strength close to 5000. In April 2001, the 
WTO had 140 members.  
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The liberalization of international transactions has gone a long way in the course of this half 
century to transform the global economic landscape. Over 45 percent of global output is now 
exported, compared to only 7 percent in the 1950s and about 32 percent in the 1970s (See Table 
1; Figure 1).  The volume of merchandise trade worldwide is some 16 times what it was in 1950; 
by comparison, global output is 5 1/2 times what it was then. Over the most recent decades, trade 
in goods and services grew twice as fast as global GDP.5 
 
A growing number of developing economies recognized the value of economic liberalization and 
outward orientation and began liberalizing their economies during the 1980s. Some did so 
unilaterally, while others moved in this direction with impetus from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, which conditioned their financial assistance on reforms designed to 
liberalize transactions and open the economy to the rest of the world.  As a result, developing 
economies now participate in international trade very significantly. The WTO league tables for 
1999, which list the 50 largest traders in the world, include twenty non-OPEC developing 
countries  (WTO, 2000). Among the top 20 are China (number 9), Hong Kong SAR (11), South 
Korea (12), Mexico (13), Taiwan (14), Singapore(15), and Malaysia (18). Accounting for 3.5 
percent of world trade in 1999, China is the single largest developing country exporter.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 2 here 
 
What is true of trade is true of services. Exports of commercial services quadrupled in the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s from US $364 billion to US $1350 billion.6  (See Table 2; Figure 3). 
Asia’s exports in commercial services increased especially rapidly in the 1990s. As a proportion 
of the world total, they rose from 16.7 percent to 22.6 percent between 1990 and 1997 (before 
declining to 19.5 percent in 1999 due to the Asian crisis).  
                                                           
5 According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) the value of world merchandise exports was $5.47 trillion in 
1999 (WTO, 2000). 
6 Commercial services include transportation and travel services and a third category called “other commercial 
services”. The last named category includes financial services, banking, insurance, construction, and computer and 
information services. 
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More intense international competition in the production of business services means reductions 
in input prices and improvements in input quality for downstream industries. Sourcing inputs 
from abroad has become common practice.7  Ironically, it means that there is a sense in which 
the integration of the world economy has thus led to the disintegration of production processes.  
It is estimated that by the early 1990s a third of all manufactures trade (approximately $800 
billion) was in parts and components. This phenomenon created an expanding web of global 
production networks that connected transnational corporations (TNCs) and their subsidiaries to 
independent designers, components producers, and parts distributors, in a process that has been 
variously described as “slicing the value chain” (Krugman (1996), “delocalization” 
(Leamer,1996), and “kaleidoscope comparative advantage” (Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994). These 
production networks offer participating firms access to new markets, facilitate the development 
of new commercial relationships, and encourage the transfer of technology. Advances in 
information technology (in particular, the Internet) have helped by integrating firms from 
developing economies into global production networks (WB, 2000).   
 
Foreign investment is of course a major factor shaping the global economy. Net flows as a 
percentage of global GDP rose from 0.48 percent to 0.65 per cent over the in the 1970s, to 1.01 
percent in 1990 and fully 2.25 percent in 1998.8  The manufacturing and service sectors have 
been the main destinations of FDI, although newly-privatized utilities have also been powerful 
attractors. French companies have invested in UK railways and utilities. Electricity generators 
and distributors from the US have gone global. Enron, the US gas company, broke traditional 
industry barriers within the energy sector and turned into generator and distributor of power. 
Hopewell, a Hong Kong property developer firm, is building power stations in China. 
 
                                                           
7 Two of the best examples of outsourcing are Barbie dolls and Nike shoes. The full range of activities that are 
outsourced by Mattle (manufacturer of Barbie dolls) and Nike are a part of their large value chain, which include all 
activities from the conception of the product to its final delivery. Barbie dolls and Nike shoes are truly global 
products. Two Barbie dolls are sold every second somewhere in the world.   
8 Global FDI as a proportion of global investment rose to equally impressive levels. Between 1970 and 1980, the 
rate of increase was slow (from 2.40 percent to 2.75 percent) but after 1980 the rate of increase was steep. In 1990, it 
was 4.40 percent of the GDI, and it further rose to 7.13 percent in 1997 (See Table 1; Figure 2). During the late 
1980s, the global level of FDI was $173 billion. 
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Transnational corporations (TNCs) have become powerful agents of market integration and 
conduits for FDI. International production by TNCs, now numbering some 63,000 parent firms 
with roughly 700,000 foreign affiliates, span virtually all countries and economic activities. 
 
The 1990s also saw considerable geographical broadening of FDI. While in the 1980s FDI was 
dominated by flows within the OECD, in the 1990s FDI flows to non-OECD countries increased 
both absolutely and as a portion of the total. A large part of these flows are accounted for by a 
small number of Asian and Latin American economies.  China is the largest developing country 
recipient, but other large FDI destinations include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and Thailand. Eastern Europe has also been attracting growing quantifies of FDI, 
especially with the progress of its accession negotiations with the European Union.  
 
Newly industrialized economies like Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, for their 
part, have become substantial FDI suppliers. Large multinational enterprises from these countries 
are globally recognized names: examples include Daewoo, Hyundai, Samsung, Evergreen, 
TSMC, Hutchison Whampoa, the Li Ka-Shing group, and Hopewell Holdings. Russia’s newly 
privatized oil companies are among the largest in the world.9  
 
Finance is the area where globalization has come closest to creating a seemlessly integrated 
global market.  Financial firms headquartered in the advanced industrial countries increasingly 
exhibit global reach. In an early survey of international financial markets, Mussa and Goldstein 
(1993) found that global financial linkages among the advanced industrial countries had 
tightened significantly over the course of the 1980s. While developing economies, especially 
emerging market economies, were also integrating themselves into global financial markets, this 
part of the process was proceeding at a slower pace. In the 1990s this process accelerated 
significantly. Whereas only some $50 billion of private portfolio capital flowed into emerging 
markets in 1990, by 1996 this number had soared to  $227 billion (before declining somewhat as 
a result of financial crises in Asia and elsewhere (see Table 6). 
                                                           
9 In terms of the value of reserves, Gazprom, the state-backed Russian monopoly, is by far the largest gas company 
in the world. 
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By the mid-1990s private capital market flows to developing economies in general had come to 
dwarf official flows. Net private capital flows to developing economies peaked at $358.7 billion 
in 1997, the year Asian crisis struck (WB, 2001). 10 In 1990, this level was $100.8 billion. The 
1997 level was almost four times higher than the peak reached during the 1978-82 commercial 
lending boom (Das, 1999: WB, 1997). Since the financial crisis of 1997, developing countries 
have not been able to access external capital to the same extent as in the recent past: net capital 
flows declined to $246 billion in 1999. However, in the wake of a strong recovery that began in 
1999, private capital flows strengthened in 2000 and reached $299.3 billion. For all appearances, 
this is the resumption of the march of financial globalization.  
 
3 Driving Forces Behind Globalization 
Why did globalization gain such momentum in the 1990s and not in earlier decades?    The 
decline in transportation and communications costs has been ongoing. In addition there was a 
dramatic fall in the cost of transmitting information, increase in the power of information 
processing leading to plummeting costs of computing, and shift from analog to digital 
information technologies that has joined the telecommunications and information processing 
industries and merged market segments of the information industry. These technological changes 
all played a role in the spread of globalization. However, the process would have not progressed 
as it did had this period not been a period of equally far-reaching changes in the policies pursued 
by the nation states. 
 
We are referring of course to the collapse of socialist economic systems in the Soviet bloc and of 
state-led policies of import substitution elsewhere. The result was that policymakers in a growing 
number of countries became increasingly predisposed toward the benefits of economic 
liberalization. Beginning with Chile in the mid-1970s, China in late-1970s and then Mexico and 
Argentina after 1982, developing countries began liberalizing their markets, opening their 
economies, and welcoming foreign direct investment. The legitimacy of many of the activities in 
which national governments had engaged — running public enterprises, administering trade 
monopolies, applying exchange and price controls, monopolizing the provision of infrastructure 
and public services — was increasingly challenged. To be sure, the momentum that globalization 
                                                           
10 Net resource flows imply capital inflows net of amortization payments.  
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gathered in the 1990s was not due to any sudden recognition of the efficacy of market forces.  
Rather, it was a decentralized, bottom-up process embraced by policy mandarins because of 
collapse of alternative visions.  
 
A small number of developing economies were in the vanguard of those pursuing these market-
oriented policies.  They performed exceedingly well – so well that the World Bank came to refer 
to them as “high-performing economies.” They managed to raise per capital incomes and 
improve living standards dramatically by deregulating their economies and opening to global 
markets.   The four East Asian “dragons” (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) are 
the most prominent examples. All were typically impoverished developing economies in the 
1950s. Overcoming significant obstacles, they all managed to achieve high grow rates and attain 
standards of living that approached (or, in the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, rivaled) those 
of the advanced industrial nations. 
 
The success of the high-performing economies had an important demonstration effect.  By the 
mid-1980s (following the launch of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations), this had spurred 
unilateral trade liberalization in a significant number of developing countries. In addition to 
liberalizing their trade, many developing countries undertook substantial liberalization of their 
investment regimes with a view towards incorporating FDI (and, in some cases, portfolio capital 
inflows) into their development and growth strategies.11 
 
As alluded to in Section 2, the expanded role of the WTO is providing momentum to 
globalization. Another institution that indirectly underpins globalization is the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund was established to promote international monetary co-
operation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements to foster economic growth and 
high levels of employment. The IMF now has virtually universal membership.12 It fulfils its 
surveillance responsibilities by appraising members’ exchange rate policies within the 
framework of a comprehensive analysis of the general economic situation and policy strategy of 
                                                           
11 Specifically, 60 countries made a total of 145 regulatory changes relating to FDI and trade liberalization (WIR, 
1999). 
12 In April 2001, the IMF had 183 members.  
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each member. A good deal of institutional harmonization, within countries and not just at the 
border, is being promoted by the IMF.   
 
4 Problems for Macroeconomic Policy 
In a globally integrating economy, slowly or rapidly, there is a greater need for a cohesive and 
stable macroeconomic regime than in an economy that is not integrating globally. A failure to 
evolve one would lead to an individual country suffering from exogenous shocks, even periodic 
crises. The end result could be slow long-term growth due to an inability to efficiently compete 
in an increasingly integrated world economy. Stability of the macroeconomic regime is to be 
judged by real variables (e.g. output and employment growth) not by nominal variables (e.g. 
prices or money supply growth, or its neo-Keynesian descendent, nominal GDP). 
Macroeconomic policy regime will be stable if fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies aim at 
ensuring a continuous and sustainable expansion of aggregate demand, with flexibility to 
counteract external shocks if the need arises (Kitson and Michie, 1999). Counter cyclical policies 
have enormous significance in economies that are open to external shocks in a globally 
integrated economy.    
 
It is evident from the experiences of the 1990s that a proactive economic policy at the national 
level has large payoff at in a globally integrating economy. It is also evident that national policy 
inaction has larger costs. Thus national policy action is rendered more important by 
globalization, not less. At the same time, national policy action is made more difficult. As 
national economies become more and more integrated, economic governance and 
macroeconomic policy become less associated with the formal structure of the state. It becomes 
increasingly associated with the competitive forces in the marketplace, involving both policy 
makers and private-sector actors. Thus, state becomes part of the market, and market forces have 
to be taken into account while in its macroeconomic decision making process.  
 
Brisk globalization of financial markets is likely to have a great deal of influence over domestic 
policy. Free inflows of capital would limit the possibility of having independent exchange rate 
and monetary policies. Free inflows of capital are likely to constrain expansionary domestic 
policies. The forex markets will react and depreciate the currency as a reaction to domestic 
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monetary expansion, which would raise real wages. Globalization of finance is likely to 
constrain the policy capacity of the state, both directly and indirectly. One important respect in 
which it is likely to happen is that capital mobility would undermine domestic regulation, 
beginning with the financial regulatory systems. Regulatory structure and government agencies 
set up to prevent or counteract market failure become less effective when both the price of 
capital and flow of capital is being determined globally. This creates financial pressure for 
deregulation, which in turn further promotes globalization. Secondly, financial globalization 
impinges upon domestic political forces and economic agents, both public and private sector, 
alter their behavior in order to adapt to and take advantage of new financial imperatives. These 
changes have affected a surprisingly wide number of actors and policy networks. A new 
deregulatory consensus has emerged among them (Grummett, 1996). Therefore, national 
governments and institutional structures have increasingly begun to adjust to the perceived need 
of financial efficiency. A clear knock-on effect is a more market-oriented bureaucracy and 
institutional structure.  
 
As the financial integration increased, market agents began to have more choice about what 
currency to use, and they became deterritorized. With accelerating cross-border business and 
financial transactions, governments found that they could no longer control the use of currency 
by their own citizens or others. Policy and management issues, therefore, slipped from the hands 
of state to market forces. Policy makers’ role became increasingly more challenging. However, 
state is still the supplier of domestic money, therefore demand management authority of the state 
has remained in tact. Several currencies have come to be employed outside their country of 
origin. Their use has either globalized or regionalized. When currencies are used outside their 
country of origin for transactions between nations they are said to be internationalized; when 
they are used within foreign states it is described as currency substitution (Mizen and Pentecost, 
1996).  Both currency internationalization and currency substitution result from market rivalry. 
This is a Darwinian process of natural selection, where essentially the forces of demand 
determine that some currencies like the dollar or the deutschmark are more attractive and reliable 
than others.  Deregulation has substantially expanded the array of effective currency choice. In a 
globalized setting state is not totally neutralized, although it does not control policy as much as it 
did in the past. The authority of the policy maker is to be shared symbiotically between 
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governments and market agents, the guiding factor being the invisible hand of competition 
(Cohen, 2000).  
 
As TNCs play a much greater role in contemporary globalization that they did in the 19th century 
globalization, it has enhanced the role of the governments in terms of making their economies 
more attractive as an investment destination and maintaining social peace. Policy makers realize 
that ignoring TNCs amount to losing opportunities for acquiring capital and technology. In 
portraying their countries as ideal locations for global investment and business, countries need to 
highlight the available resources. To this end, advertisements and special sections in economic, 
business, and financial newspapers is a common feature. The resources and special features that 
they highlight include location, abundant natural resources, strong infrastructure, vibrant capital 
markets, inexpensive and high quality labor force. It is believed by some that governments in 
their eagerness to attract TNC investment dilute their labor, environmental standards, and health 
and safety laws. It has come to be known as “races to the bottom”. However, Spar and Yoffie 
(2000) found this charge incorrect. This could be true during the period when TNC investments 
were primarily in the extractive sectors or labor-intensive industries. At present, they 
increasingly invest in high-technology sectors because this is where their ownership-based 
advantages lie. Also, as nearly 60 percent of the TNC investment flows are between 
industrialized countries with comparable levels of labor and environmental standards, races to 
the bottom are not possible. Since the traditional advantages of countries, namely, cheap labor, or 
low environmental standards and neither highly valued by TNCs nor relevant to them, policy 
makers face a generic challenge to devise new policies to attract knowledge- and technology-
intensive FDI (UNCTAD, 1997).  
 
The ability to attract fresh TNC investments varies across countries and across industries. A 
good example is China and Russia, both of which have huge untapped markets which TNCs 
covet. However, China has been a favored destination for FDI, while Russia is not an attractive 
destination so far. Although both the economies lack policy transparency, TNCs find China more 
attractive because of its well-functioning markets, and stable and predictable policy-making 
environment. Hart and Prakash (2000) provide the following advice to policy makers in this 
regard: (i) policy makers should not allow their countries to be used as pawns in global inter-
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TNC warfare; (ii) policy makers need to carefully scrutinize claims that everyone wins or loses 
when FDI flows into their country on a case-by-case basis, and (iii) policy makers need to retain 
policy autonomy to maximize the benefits of FDI flows and to safeguard the interests of non-
business societal actors.  
 
Fiscal policies are known to affect globalization. Tax incentives, or legal tax avoidance, are 
known to move capital globally. Tax avoidance can be both a causal factor behind gobalization 
as well as its effect. As global integration expanded, many thoughtful scholars commented on the 
eroding policy making capabilities of the nation-state. Lawrence, Bressand and Ito (1996) drew 
attention to the changing capacity of the nation-state “to tax and spend”. As the factors of 
production can earn higher rent by crossing the border, ceteris paribas rational economic agents 
would do so if the borders are open. Labor movement may not be swift because individuals 
offering their labor services would not like to abandon a familiar environment, in spite of 
incentives,  and web of social connections simply to earn higher material rewards elsewhere. 
This is a stylized constraining view of capital and labor mobility and their fiscal implications. 
Although capital and skilled labor mobility story in a globally integrating economy is not new, 
governments do not lose their fiscal powers completely (Kudrle, 2000). This is because even 
after moving, an individual continues to reside in one jurisdiction or the other and unless his or 
her earnings are hidden, he or she faces a tax liability. The same logic applies to globalizing 
capital.  
 
The flip side of this coin is that  tax and expenditure apparatuses are highly inefficient in many 
countries. On occasions, states have been blamed for predatory practices. Individuals and 
corporate escape from its clutches as both a just response to, and visible warning about, current 
state practices. In a globally integrated world, firms and highly mobile and skilled individuals 
will encounter rising incentives to move away from high-tax jurisdictions that are not providing a 
compensating level of public services. This would intensify pressure on governments to search 
for most cost-effective ways of delivering services and to eliminate funding of unnecessary 
programs and subsidies (Litan and Niskanen, 1998). 
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5 Vexing Volatility 
As they integrate into the world economy, emerging markets inevitably become exposed to 
disturbances from outside their borders.13  And as they become integrated into global markets, 
they become susceptible to contagion-related spillovers from national, regional and global 
financial crises.14  This does not mean that the costs of globalization necessarily swamp the 
benefits, but it points to the need to develop institutions and pursue policies aimed at limiting 
volatility and minimizing the consequences.15  
 
5.1 Effects of Volatility. 
There is now extensive evidence of the costs of macroeconomic volatility.16  Ramey and Ramey 
(1995) estimate that a unit increase in the standard deviation of the innovation in GDP reduces 
the rate of growth of GDP per capita by one-fifth of one per cent per annum.  Easterly and Kraay 
(1999) also find that an increase in the standard deviation of growth reduces the average annual 
rate of per capita growth by roughly the same order of magnitude as Ramey and Ramey.17  Upon 
controlling for other determinants of the secular rate of growth that are standard in the empirical 
literature, IDB (1995) finds that growth depends negatively on the volatility of the terms of trade, 
the volatility of the real exchange rate, the volatility of monetary policy, and the volatility of 
fiscal policy.18  Using data ending in 1992, IDB estimates that real GDP (measured in growth 
                                                           
13 For example, the slump in global semiconductor prices, an instance of an adverse terms-of-trade shock, is blamed 
for undermining the health of the Korean economy in the run-up to its 1997-8 crisis (Goldstein 1998). 
14The fact that China and the whole of South Asia did not succumb to the Asian crisis has been ascribed to the fact 
that they had retained capital controls and consequently was not deeply integrated into global financial markets. 
More generally, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) have shown that countries are more likely to be able to 
contain speculative pressure when they are not yet integrated into global financial markets. 
15While the view that openness is a source of volatility is commonplace (and will strike many readers as 
intuitive), the evidence is mixed.  Kraay (1998) analyzes the connections between financial openness and the 
volatility of capital flows and fails to detect a consistent effect. 
16A compendium of research on this topic is Interamerican Development Bank (1995). 
17Obvious issues arise about the direction of causality underlying all of these correlations which should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
18The largest effects are associated with the volatility of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.  A 
variety of other studies (e.g. Mendoza 1994, Guillaumont, Jeanneney and Brun 1999, Easterly and Kraay 1999) 
have also documented this association between terms-of-trade volatility and growth. 
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rates) was half again as volatile in East and South Asia as in the advanced industrial countries.19  
De Ferranti et al. (2000), upon updating these calculations through the end of the 1990s (thereby 
including the Asian crisis), predictably find a larger differential: real GDP volatility has been 
fully twice as volatile in East Asia as in the industrial countries. South Asia, for its part, lies 
midway between East Asia and the industrial countries according to these calculations.20  
 
Does this volatility reflect external disturbances or domestic policies?  For the period ending in 
1992, the answer is “policies” if the comparison is with the industrial countries.  On average, the 
external shocks experienced by East and South Asian countries were not dramatically different in 
magnitude than those hitting the advanced-industrial countries.  The standard deviation of the 
change in the terms of trade was roughly the same.21 Nor was the  standard deviation of 
international capital flows as a percentage of GDP dramatically different than in the U.S., Europe 
and Japan.22   But budget deficits were relatively volatile outside the four East Asian “miracle 
economies” (in which the volatility of fiscal policy is indistinguishable from the advanced-
industrial countries).23  And monetary policy was relatively volatile throughout the region.  The 
IDB’s estimates imply that this volatility reduced growth in East Asia over the period 1960-1985 
by about a tenth of a percent a year.24    
                                                           
19In an accounting sense, much of this differential is attributable to investment (again measured in terms of 
its rate of growth), which was twice as volatile in the “East Asian Miracle” economies as the industrial countries 
over the sample period. 
20Thus, real GDP growth volatility as calculated by de Ferranti et al. (2000) has risen from 3 per cent in 
the 1960s through 1980s to 4 ½ per cent in the 1990s for East Asia, but fallen from more than 2 ½ per cent to a bit 
more than 1 ½ per cent in South Asia over the same period. 
21Terms-of-trade shocks can obviously be calculated in different ways, and decisions of how to do so may 
be import for such comparisons.  Thus, de Ferranti et al. (2000) compare the volatility of the change in the terms of 
trade across regions and decades, but also interact this measure with the openness of the economy (to derive a 
measure they label “terms of trade shocks”).  While terms-of-trade disturbances to South Asia in the 1990s were 
nearly four times as large as to East Asia according to the first measure, they were of identical magnitude according 
to the second. 
22This pattern obviously changed as Asian economies opened their markets to international capital flows 
in the 1990s, as the 1997 crisis revealed and the updated estimates to be discussed momentarily indicate clearly. 
23The public consumption component of the budget, however, has consistently been more volatile in East 
Asia than the industrial countries (de Ferrenti et al. 2000). 
24While East Asian investment rates are high by international standards, recent empirical work suggests 
that they would have been higher still (by an additional two to three percentage points of GDP) if volatility had 
been as low as in the U.S., Europe and Japan. 
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5.2 Effects on growth 
The negative association of volatility with growth reflects adverse impacts on productivity and 
investment.  Productivity will suffer if unpredictable changes in relative prices render one 
technology appropriate but lead firms to invest in another.  In the face of relative-price 
uncertainty, companies may hedge their bets by investing in several alternative technologies, all 
but one of which will less efficient and productive than the optimal technology in any state of 
nature.  Countries where volatility is high also display relatively low investment rates, reflecting 
the reluctance of entrepreneurs to commit to projects when prices and macroeconomic conditions 
change unpredictably.25 
 
It can be argued that this emphasis overlooks a major source of volatility and a key channel 
through which volatility exercises its adverse effect on growth, namely, financial crises.  Crises 
are incompatible with growth: they lead to stop-go policies, interfere with the operation of the 
domestic financial system, cause distress in the corporate sector, and force governments to 
curtail public investment.  According to Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebeil and Martinez-Peria 
(2001), the typical post-1972 crisis cost the country in which it occurred a cumulative 8 per cent 
of GDP -- that is, one to two years of growth for an Asian country.  Different types of crises have 
different output effects: the estimates of these authors suggest output costs ranging from 6 per 
cent for both currency and banking crises to 19 per cent for twin crises (which have both banking 
and currency components).  
 
5.3 Effects on social indicators. 
There is now ample evidence that volatility has undesirable consequences for income 
distribution, poverty, and educational attainment.  The poor, unskilled and uneducated are least 
able to protect themselves by hedging their incomes and diversifying their investments; it stands 
to reason that they should suffer disproportionately from volatility.  Gavin and Hausmann (1995) 
find, in a study of a cross-section of countries, that the volatility of real GDP has a strong 
negative effect on the equality of income distribution.  Other studies (e.g. Guitan 1995) have 
similarly found that countries with more volatile rates of inflation display greater income 
                                                           
25See IDB (1995), Goldberg (1993) and Kenen and Rodrik (1986). 
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inequality.  Moreover, there is evidence that crises and the policy adjustments they entail are 
particularly bad for income distribution and that their unequalizing effects are especially 
pronounced in middle-income countries.26 
 
The same is true of poverty rates.  The poor and near poor tend to be employed in sectors and 
activities that suffer from volatility, and cuts in social spending in times of crisis fall 
disproportionately on their shoulders (Morley 1994).  As noted above, households near the 
poverty line have the least savings, the worst collateral, and the most tenuous access to credit and 
insurance.  Moreover, volatility aggravates poverty through its negative impact on growth.  
Ravallion (1997) estimates that the elasticity of poverty, as measured by the proportion of the 
population falling below the poverty line, with respect to the growth of per capita income lies 
between -1.5 and -3.5.  Dollar (2000) obtains similar results for a larger sample of countries.  
Crises are an extreme case in point, in that the elasticity of poverty with respect to income rises 
sharply in crisis periods.  In Indonesia in 1997-8, the rate of increase of poverty is estimated to 
have been ten times the rate of decline in income and consumption.  In Korea, the poverty rate as 
conventionally measured more than doubled between 1997 and 1998.  Previous studies relating 
poverty rates to per capita incomes in Korea would have led to forecasts of barely a fifth this 
amount.27 
 
In addition volatility is associated with low levels of educational attainment. It affects education 
partly through its impact on inequality: Williamson (1993) finds that more egalitarian societies 
(as measured by the ratio of the share of total income of the bottom 40 per cent to the share of 
the top 20 per cent) have higher secondary school enrollment rates.  In economies that are 
volatile, the poor, who are already on the margin of subsistence, may be forced to withdraw their 
children from school so that the latter can contribute to household income, and this interruption 
of attendance will hinder educational attainment.  Governments, forced by crises to cut social 
                                                           
26See Bourguignon, de Melo and Suwa (1991). 
27See the discussion in World Bank (2000b).  Cutler et al. (2000), in a study of several successive Mexican 
crises, find that crisis-related volatility worsens health outcomes.  In the Tequila of 1995-6, mortality rates were 5 
to 7 per cent higher than in the immediate pre-crisis years.  The greatest percentage increase was among the elderly.  
This effect seems to operate mainly by reducing incomes and placing a heavier burden on the medical sector, rather 
than by forcing less healthy members of the population into the labor force or by compelling primary care-givers to 
go to work. 
 18
services, may be unable to sustain adequate levels of spending on schooling and to retain capable 
instructors.  Where volatility hinders the development of financial markets, families will find it 
particularly difficult to insure against these risks, forcing them to rely on their children for 
relatively inefficient insurance.  These effects are likely to be most pronounced in poorer 
countries suffering larger shocks: thus, it is revealing that school enrollment rates fell in 
Indonesia but not in Thailand or Korea in 1998 (Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle 1999). 
 
6. Managing Volatility. 
If globalization can aggravate volatility and volatility can aggravate social ills, then it is 
important to adopt policies and develop institutions to limit the volatility that globalization can 
bring.  There is an immense literature on policies for limiting volatility in emerging markets and 
safeguarding against crisis, if less than full agreement among the contributors.  Still, there would 
appear to be a consensus on the following points.   
 
First, foreign trade and investment confer substantial benefits.  The positive impact on the 
growth of merchandise trade and FDI is now widely recognized, though the benefits of portfolio 
capital flows continue to be questioned.  In principle, the portfolio investment permitted by 
capital account liberalization should relax financial constraints on growth, deepen domestic 
financial markets, and make direct investment more attractive by facilitating the hedging of 
exposures and the repatriation of profits.  That said, there is concern that the interaction of 
portfolio capital flows with preexisting distortions can heighten volatility and create crisis risk.  
The results of Klein and Olivei (1999) are interpretable in this light; the authors find that 
portfolio capital flows stimulate financial deepening and, by inference, growth in relatively high 
income countries, where policy and market distortions are least, but if anything have a perverse 
effect on financial development in low-income non-OECD countries.   
 
Second, as globalization proceeds, statutory restrictions on transactions on capital account will 
become increasingly difficult to operate without disrupting other forms of economic activity.  
Foreign direct investment and multinational production will lead to a growing volume of cross-
border transactions by financially-sophisticated agents on the lookout for ways of circumventing 
controls.  As small firms penetrate export markets, they will gain the ability to evade controls 
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through leads and lags and over- and under-invoicing.  The forward march of information and 
communications technologies will open up avenues for evasion by households—by facilitating 
international financial transactions via the Internet, for example.  Thus, the effective operation of 
capital controls will require increasingly comprehensive and invasive restrictions on economic 
behavior, extending to domains well beyond the financial.  This is something that individuals are 
unlikely to welcome and something that they can effectively oppose in an age of 
democratization. 
 
The bottom line is that capital account liberalization is likely to become increasingly difficult to 
resist as economic and financial globalization proceeds.  This heightens the importance of 
coordinating international financial liberalization with the elimination of distortions that would 
otherwise cause it to heighten volatility and crisis risk.  Concretely, this means the following.28 
 
6.1 Strengthening the financial sector in preparation for capital account liberalization 
Capital account liberalization will have net benefits only if it is preceded by measures to 
strengthen the domestic financial sector, remove implicit guarantees, and impose hard budget 
constraints on financial institutions.  If bank capitalization is inadequate, managers will be 
inclined to excessive risk taking, and the offshore funding available through the capital account 
will permit them to lever up their bets.  If bank liabilities are guaranteed on the grounds that 
widespread bank failures would be devastating to a financial system dominated by banks, foreign 
investors will not hesitate to provide the requisite funding.  A simple explanation for why the 
resolution costs of banking crises have been larger in the 1980s and 1990s than in earlier decades 
and larger in emerging than advanced economies is the coincidence of these domestic financial 
weaknesses with premature capital-account opening.   
 
Capital account liberalization thus should follow rather than precede recapitalization of the 
banking sector, the reinforcement of prudential supervision and regulation, and the removal of 
blanket guarantees. The corollary is that capital-account restrictions should remain in place until 
prudential supervision is strengthened and implicit guarantees are removed.  Unfortunately, 
                                                           
28More details on the points that follow can be found in Eichengreen (2000a), from which this discussion 
draws. 
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maintaining barriers to capital flows and foreign financial competition may diminish the pressure 
for restructuring; developing countries may never achieve the nirvana where their domestic 
financial systems have been strengthened sufficiently to allow the capital accounts to be 
liberalized.  This suggests using capital account liberalization to force the issue.  But recent 
experience in Asia and elsewhere casts doubt on the notion that external liberalization which 
increases the urgency of complementary financial reforms will necessarily deliver the needed 
reforms before crisis strikes.  While crisis sometimes breeds reform, it does so at a price.  
 
6.2 Liberalize foreign direct investment as quickly as possible. 
FDI is the form of foreign investment that most plausibly comes packaged with managerial and 
technological expertise.  It is the form least likely to aggravate weaknesses in the domestic 
banking system.   It is the form least likely to be associated with capital flight and creditor panic.  
This suggests liberalizing inward foreign investment as the first stage of financial-side opening.  
It suggests liberalizing inward FDI as quickly as possible.  This advice would seem obvious but 
for the large number of governments that have failed to heed it.  As of 1996, 144 of 184 
countries surveyed by the IMF still maintained controls on FDI.  One element of the Korean 
crisis was the government’s reluctance to allow inward FDI and its readiness, in the face of 
foreign pressure, to instead open other components of the capital account.29 
 
Skeptics like Dooley (1996) and Kraay (1998) question whether FDI is more stable than other 
capital flows.  In fact, data on the volatility of flows (World Bank 1999) do not suggest a strong 
contrast between direct investment and portfolio capital.  Still, there is an obvious sense in which 
a foreign direct investor cannot easily unbolt machines from the factory floor in order to 
participate in a creditor panic.30  Admittedly, direct investors have a particular incentive to hedge 
by purchasing other financial assets, which they can liquidate in a crisis.  They can borrow on 
domestic markets in order to sell short the domestic financial assets needed to take positions in 
                                                           
29Admittedly, Thailand’s lifting of most restrictions on inward FDI in import-competing industries in the 
1970s and on export industries in the 1980s did not prevent a serious crisis.  But the problem there was that the 
country also opened the capital account to portfolio flows without strengthening its financial system and 
rationalizing prudential supervision. 
30A recent study by Sarno and Taylor (1999), using time series data for Asian and Latin American 
countries and Kalman filtering methods, does in fact find that FDI flows have a larger permanent component than 
bank credit, equity flows, bond flows and official credit. 
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anticipation of a currency collapse.  The implication is that the share of inward foreign 
investment in the form of FDI will offer some protection against financial instability in the early 
stages of capital account liberalization — that is, before the rest of the capital account has been 
opened and direct foreign investors, like others, can take positions on securities markets to hedge 
their exposures.31  But the more open the capital account, the easier it becomes to arbitrage 
different instruments, and the less the share of FDI in total capital inflows is likely to matter in 
this respect. 
 
6.3 Use of internationalization to strengthen the banking system. 
The case for liberalizing FDI early in the process of external financial opening extends to the 
banking system.  Entry by foreign banks is a low-cost way of upgrading the sector’s risk-
management capacity.  The knowledge spillovers that figure prominently in discussions of other 
forms of FDI apply also to the financial sector.  Moreover, insofar as foreign banks are overseen 
by their home-country regulators, opening the banking sector to foreign investment should raise 
the average quality of prudential supervision.  And insofar as foreign banks are better capitalized, 
they are less likely to engage in excessive risk taking.  For all these reasons, entry by foreign 
banks can accelerate the upgrading of domestic financial arrangements that is a prerequisite for 
further capital account liberalization (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min 1998). 
 
Equally, it is important to avoid creating artificial incentives for bank-to-bank lending.  Thailand 
opened other components of the capital account before giving banks access to offshore funds.  
But it then created the Bangkok International Banking Facility, under which Thai banks 
borrowing offshore (and on-loaning the proceeds in foreign-currency terms) received favorable 
tax and licensing treatment.  In part this policy is to be understood as an attempt to develop 
Bangkok as an international financial center.  In part it reflects the government’s tendency to use 
                                                           
31There are two rebuttals to this assertion.  First, the correlation between the share of short-term foreign 
debt in capital inflows and crisis risk may be detecting symptoms rather than causes.  In other words, as the risk of 
crisis rises for other reasons, foreign investors will shorten the length of their claims in the hope of being able to get 
out before the crisis finally strikes.  Second, some countries may have high ratios of FDI in total inflows not 
because they offer attractive production platforms for foreign multinationals but because they are wholly incapable 
of attracting portfolio capital, reflecting unsustainable financial policies and inadequate contract enforcement.  
Ricardo Hausmann has made this point in a series of recent papers. 
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the banks as an instrument of industrial policy.  Either way it is indicative of policies that are 
incompatible with the goal of limiting volatility. 
 
6.4 Relying on market-friendly instruments for regulating foreign exposures. 
The preceding might be taken as encouragement for governments to micro-manage the process 
of liberalization.  But efforts to fine tune the capital account carry their own dangers.  They 
threaten to create a heavy administrative bureaucracy conducive to rent seeking and capture.  
Financial development makes it progressively easier for participants to evade the authorities’ 
efforts by relabeling positions and repackaging obligations.  Interventions which rely on markets 
instead of bureaucrats minimize these risks.  This is the attraction of the Chilean approach to 
capital-import taxes.  The Chileans required a non-interest-bearing deposit of one year duration 
from investors seeking to import capital from abroad.32  Since the deposit had to be maintained 
for a year, the implicit tax fell more heavily on investors with short horizons than on those 
prepared to stay for the long haul.  It was transparent and insulated from administrative 
discretion.  There was less scope for evasion than of taxes designed to fall on some foreign 
investments but not others. 
 
There is an enormous debate over the effectiveness of these measures.33  Some warn that 
avoidance is a problem.  Others point to the lack of evidence that Chile’s taxes limited the 
overall level of foreign borrowing.  And still others observe that the Chileans have themselves 
abolished the measure, which should raise questions about its efficacy. 
 
The third objection is misplaced in the sense that the Chilean tax remains on the books; all that 
has been done is to set the tax rate to zero for the time being.  The rationale for doing so was that 
capital inflows were in particularly short supply following the Asian and Russian crises; a 
prudential measure that might have been desirable under other circumstances then became too 
expensive to operate in this period of capital scarcity.   
                                                           
32The tax was initially set at 20 per cent in 1991, raised to 30 per cent in 1992, reduced to 10 per cent in 
June of 1998 and set to zero per cent in October, and the scope of capital flows to which it was applied was 
progressively widened.  Investors could opt to pay the central bank a sum equivalent to the forgone interest without 
actually placing the deposit with the bank, as some in fact chose to do. 
33A comprehensive review of the issues and literature is Ulan (2000). 
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More fundamentally, Chilean-style holding period taxes can be justified as a form of prudential 
supervision, where short-term inflows, because they are volatile, pose risks to financial 
stability.34  Attempting to limit bank borrowing offshore will be futile if domestic non-financial 
corporations are free to borrow and to pass on the proceeds to the banks.  Hence the case for an 
across-the-board holding-period tax on inflows on prudential grounds.35  This should be regarded 
as a transitional policy to be pursued until more conventional forms of prudential supervision and 
regulation have been upgraded, at which point exceptional measures directed toward the capital 
account can come off.  Chile itself can be thought of as having completed this process of 
upgrading in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The second objection -- that there is no evidence of the measure reducing the level of capital 
inflows -- overlooks the fact that the goal was never to limit the level of borrowing.  Rather, the 
goal was alter its maturity  -- to limit short-term inflows as a share of total debt and a share of 
international reserves.  And on the maturity front the evidence is compelling (see Gallego, 
Hernandez and Schmidt-Hebbel 1999).36 As for the first objection, it is important to recall that 
such a measure, to effectively lengthen the maturity structure of the debt, need not be evasion 
free.  
 
The same point -- the desirability of transparent, comprehensive, market-based taxes rather than 
controls -- applies equally to the outflow side.  One manifestation of this fact is how Malaysia 
has moved from comprehensive outflow controls to an exit tax on foreign capital satisfying a 
                                                           
34This analogy is not without limitations; see Laurens and Cardoso (1998) for the relevant objections. 
35Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1998) argue that this invocation of prudential supervision does not justify 
controls on non-banks.  But this view overlooks the scope for arbitrage between the bank and non-bank sectors. 
36That studies of other countries that have employed similar policies reach analogous conclusions is 
reassuring.  See for example Cardenas and Barrera (1995) on Colombia.   More generally, Calvo and Reinhart 
(1999) find in a 15 country panel, including Chile, that the presence of capital controls is associated with a lower 
share of portfolio plus short-term capital flows as a percentage of total flows.  That they do not find the same when 
they look at portfolio flows alone suggests that the impact on short-term flows is doing most of the work. 
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minimum-stay requirement.37  But not too much should be expected of outflow controls in times 
of crisis, given the strong incentives that then exist for avoidance.     
 
6.5 Liberalizing stock and bond markets next. 
Because bank deposits are a contractual obligation to repay at par, the withdrawal of foreign 
deposits can jeopardize the stability of the banking system.  In contrast, when investors liquidate 
their positions in stock and bond markets, their actions simply show up in the prices of securities, 
which is less destabilizing to the financial system.38  When banks and firms can fund themselves 
by floating bonds as well as issuing short-term debt, the destabilizing impact on their balance 
sheets of sharp changes in market interest rates will be less.  And when they can fund themselves 
by issuing bonds denominated in domestic as well as foreign currency, the destabilizing financial 
impact of sharp changes in exchange rates will be reduced.  This suggests developing of bond 
markets as a way of diversifying the sources of corporate debt, and developing stock markets as 
a way of avoiding excessive reliance on debt in general.  It suggests liberalizing foreign access to 
domestic stock and bond markets before freeing banks to fund themselves offshore. 
 
The reality is that securitized markets -- stock and bond markets alike -- are late to develop.  
Historically, markets in corporate bonds and debentures tend to develop before deep and liquid 
equity markets since their informational requirements are less (Baskin and Miranti 1997).  But 
even they tend to develop only once a deep and reliable market has first grown up in a 
benchmark asset, typically treasury bonds, transactions in which provide liquidity and minimum 
efficient scale and whose prices provide a reference point for other issues.  And the development 
of a deep and liquid treasury bond market in turn requires a government with a record of sound 
and stable macroeconomic and financial policies.  Where that record is lacking, banks become 
                                                           
37In September of 1998, nonresidents were prohibited from repatriating investments in domestic-currency-
denominated financial assets for a 12 month period.  These quantitative controls were replaced by graduated exit 
levies in February 1999. 
38In reality, things are not so simple.  A stock- or bond-market crash can damage the balance-sheet 
position of banks and others who themselves hold stocks and bonds.  It can make life difficult for entities, 
including the government, with funding needs and for whom the prices of their liabilities are an important signal of 
credit worthiness.  But the single most reliable predictor turned up by the copious literature on leading indicators of 
currency crises is the term structure of portfolio capital inflows (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Rodrik and Velasco 
1999). 
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the captive customers for government bond placements, which is not good for their balance 
sheets and in return for which they receive other favors (such as guarantees) which give rise to 
the financial-sector problems alluded to above. 
 
In practice, the informational and contractual prerequisites for the development of deep and 
active stock markets are substantial -- even more substantial than the prerequisites for the 
development of deep and active bond markets.  In the absence of disclosure by firms following 
recognized auditing and accounting practices, outsiders will be reluctant to purchase their 
securities for fear of market manipulation by insiders; hence, stock market capitalization and 
turnover will be low.  In the absence of adequate contract enforcement and equitable bankruptcy 
procedures, investors will be reluctant to invest for fear that issuers will walk away from their 
obligations.  And in the absence of adequate mechanisms for corporate control, investors will be 
reluctant to purchase minority stakes in publicly-traded enterprises for fear of being expropriated 
by majority stakeholders.  This is why significant stock market capitalization and turnover tend 
to be observed relatively late in the process of financial development -- it is why this was the 
case historically even in countries like the United Kingdom and United States that now have 
some of the most advanced market-based financial systems in the world.  It is why many 
countries, and developing countries in particular, rely on banks for intermediation services, 
banks having a comparative advantage through long-term relationships with their clients in 
assembling information and enforcing contracts.   
 
Creating active stock and bond markets thus requires putting in place a regulatory framework 
mandating the disclosure of accurate and up-to-date financial information, the use of recognized 
auditing and accounting standards, penalties for insider trading and market manipulation, and 
statutes protecting the rights of minority shareholders.  In the United States, putting in place 
these prerequisites for deep and liquid markets took several decades (Bordo, Eichengreen and 
Irwin 1999).  Late-developing economies in Asia and elsewhere can telescope this process by 
importing proven regulatory technologies.39   Still, developing deep and active stock and bond 
markets is a hard slog.  Success will not be achieved overnight.  
                                                           
39They can also follow the example of U.S. companies prior to the emergence of deep and liquid domestic 
securities markets — U.S. railways, the large corporations of their time, issued bonds and debentures in London as 
a way of circumventing the underdevelopment of American financial markets — but this will not solve the 
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6.6 Accumulate reserves. 
The response of many Asian countries to the volatility of 1997-8 has been to accumulate a 
cushion of international reserves.  The strategy has met with support from academics and 
officials.  Feldstein (1999) has encouraged emerging markets to accumulate reserves as 
insurance against the disruptive domestic financial effects abrupt capital outflows.  Guidotti 
(1999) and Greenspan (1999) have similarly suggested that countries hold foreign exchange 
reserves equal to all the short-term debt scheduled to fall due over the next 12 months.  They 
point to the success of countries with substantial reserves (Taiwan for example) in withstanding 
the Asian crisis.  A recent IMF study (Bussiere and Mulder 1999) suggests that countries may 
want to hold even larger reserves, perhaps as much as twice those suggested by the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule, and that countries that run chronic current account deficits should hold still 
larger reserves, as should countries seeking to limit exchange rate variability. 
 
There are reasons to question this advice.  First, even large reserves a la Taiwan are small 
relative to the liquidity of the markets.  A confidence crisis can cause investors to try to transfer 
abroad not only short-term foreign liabilities but the whole of M2.  Converting these claims into 
foreign currency is likely to be impossibly expensive for a government or central bank seeking to 
support a currency peg. 
 
Moreover, large reserves can provide dangerous encouragement to the carry trade (Dooley 
1998).  Normally, interest rates are lower in the major money centers than in an emerging market 
that has recently stabilized and opened its capital account, encouraging foreign investors to 
funnel money into the country.  The larger reserves, the more confident will be investors that 
they will be able to get out without suffering losses when sentiment turns and the banking system 
comes under pressure.  Hence, the greater will be bank-to-bank lending, and the higher will be 
the costs of a banking crisis. 
 
Holding reserves against short-term external liabilities is expensive, since U.S. treasury bonds 
bear lower interest rates than Thai or Korean bank deposits.  As Grenville (1999, p.6) has put it, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
currency-of-denomination issue; it will not create an investor base with an appetite for domestic-currency-
denominated issues. 
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Greenspan’s advice “raises the issue of why this short-term debt was useful in the first place, if 
the proceeds of the short-term borrowing have to be stacked away in reserves (at a lower rate of 
return than the cost of borrowing).”  The implication is straightforward: if short-term foreign 
borrowing comes with risks that are expensive to insure against, wouldn’t it be better to avoid it 
in the first place? 
 
Clearly, countries seeking protection from volatility should accumulate a cushion of reserves.  
But more is not always better.  Even sound advice can be taken too far. 
 
6.7 Arranging  commercial credits. 
The other approach to ensuring the availability of adequate liquidity in an emergency is to 
negotiate commercial credit lines in advance.  From the standpoint of the borrowing countries, 
these lines would provide additional resources to insure against shocks to investor confidence.  If 
foreign investors refuse to renew their maturing loans, the authorities can draw on their credit 
lines to finance the lender-of-last-resort operations appropriate for dealing with a liquidity crisis.  
Argentina, Mexico, and Indonesia negotiated facilities with international banks that, in return for 
a commitment fee, allowed them to draw hard-currency credits.  These facilities typically omit 
the no-adverse-material-change clause that permits banks to back out of an agreement in the 
event of a crisis.  Argentina’s agreement with 13 commercial banks, finalized in December 1996, 
provided for a $6.1 billion contingent credit line to be accessed through a repurchase facility 
(drawings on which are collateralized by the deposit of an equivalent amount of peso-
denominated government bonds).  It has been rolled over once, with an increase in the 
commitment fee from approximately 30 to 60 basis points.  The $2.5 billion Mexican facility, in 
contrast, was a pure credit line.  Mexico drew its lines in September 1998 despite complaints by 
the bankers, who objected that there was no emergency justifying the action at the time; partly as 
a consequence of this dispute, the Mexican facility was not renewed.  Indonesia made two 
drawings on its stand-by facilities, totaling $1.5 billion, most recently in April 1998.   
 
That these credits are a form of insurance again raises the issue of how adverse selection is 
overcome.  Argentina, Mexico and Indonesia’s success in purchasing this insurance suggests that 
the problem of asymmetric information that might otherwise cause the market to break down can 
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be overcome at least partially by the posting of collateral (as in the Argentine case, where the 
value of that collateral is enhanced by the country’s currency-board law) and by other policies 
that help to signal credit worthiness.  That these countries succeeded in negotiating these 
arrangements suggests that at least some other countries showing evidence of institutional reform 
and a record of strong policies could do likewise.  But given that other countries lacking these 
advantages will not be able to signal their credit quality so easily, this option may not be 
available to all. 
 
Insurance unavoidably creates the danger of moral hazard, so those who advocate the use of such 
lines need to worry about the incentive effects.  These arrangements are essentially 
unconditional; in contrast to IMF loans, access is not contingent on the country agreeing to 
specific adjustment measures.  Consequently, access to additional funds may encourage some 
governments to engage in additional risk-taking and put off adjustment.  The “penalty rate” they 
pay to draw these lines may be some deterrent, but there remains the question of whether it is 
enough.  The strong steps Argentina and now Mexico are taking to strengthen their institutions 
and policies provides some reassurance that they will not succumb to these temptations.  But it is 
not clear that the same will necessarily be true of other countries. 
 
A further weakness of these arrangements is that the banks will be able to hedge their exposures.  
At the same time they provide additional credits, they can draw down their other exposure to the 
country or sell short government bills and bonds.  The sell-off in the Mexican bond market that 
occurred when that country’s government drew its lines in the fall of 1998 may have been an 
instance of this effect.  Taken to an extreme, this “dynamic-hedging” argument suggests the 
country will have no additional financial resources for propping up its banking system and 
coping with the other consequences of a crisis.  The less extreme version is that countries relying 
on this technique may have less insurance than meets the eye. 
 
Thus, while commercial credits lines are not a bad idea, they are likely to be available only to 
countries with relatively strong policies, and the amount of money they actually make available 
may be less than it appears. 
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6.8 Strengthening monetary and fiscal institutions. 
Limiting volatility in a financially globalized world requires building credible policy-making 
institutions.  The greater the credibility of the individuals and institutions responsible for 
monetary policy, the less the danger that a shock will incite an investor panic and a self-fulfilling 
crisis.  To the contrary, if policy makers have accumulated sufficient credibility, the markets will 
do much of the stabilizing work for them.  If inflation accelerates, for example, pushing up 
interest rates and depressing the prices of short-term interest-bearing assets, investors 
anticipating that the acceleration of inflation is only temporary will buy into temporarily 
depressed fixed-income markets, stabilizing asset prices and interest rates.  If the currency 
depreciates, investors will similarly purchase domestic-currency-denominated assets at their 
temporarily depressed prices, providing capital inflows that work to strengthen the exchange 
rate.   
 
Similarly, the more credible is fiscal policy, the greater will be the capacity to pursue counter-
cyclically stabilizing budgetary policies.  If the fiscal authorities are committed to running 
budgets that are balanced over the cycle, they will be able borrow and run deficits in recessions.  
If, on the other hand, policy makers’ intentions are suspect, they will have to cut spending and/or 
raise taxes in recessions, rendering fiscal policy pro-cyclical and aggravating rather than limiting 
volatility.   
 
One solution is to delegate responsibility for policy to an individual or individuals with a 
reputation for valuing the appropriate objectives; the utility of this approach is questionable, 
however, so long as the policy makers in question can be arbitrarily dismissed (Drazen and 
Masson 1994).  The alternative is to design policy-making institutions so that the individuals in 
question have an incentive to pursue particular objectives and the capacity to do so.  Hard-and-
fast rules — a currency board arrangement for monetary policy, a balanced-budget rule for fiscal 
policy — are the obvious way of doing so, but these lack the flexibility desirable for coping with 
a volatile environment.  A more flexible approach is to give the policy authorities a mandate and 
the independence to pursue it.  For monetary policy this is the well-known formula of 
independence for the central bank and a mandate to pursue price stability.  For fiscal policy there 
is an analogous argument for creating an independent fiscal authority responsible for setting a 
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ceiling for the budget deficit and a set of rules for cutting expenditure in the event that the fiscal 
authorities overrun it (Eichengreen, Hausmann and von Hagen 1999).   
 
7. Conclusion 
The premise of this paper is that there exist powerful technical, economic and political forces 
likely to render the world economy even more globalized tomorrow than today.  Globalization 
has been rolled back before, but only under extraordinary circumstances.  And the costs today for 
the world economy were a sizeable number of countries to turn their backs on global markets 
could exceed even those incurred in the 1930s, given the decline in the cost of international 
transportation and communication, the spread of global production networks, and the progress 
made in drawing countries and regions once only marginally integrated into the world economy 
more deeply into the global system.  Countries, their governments, and their citizens have 
substantial investments in globalization.  Significant costs have been sunk, making it unlikely 
that the clock will be turned back.  
  
 The challenge is therefore how to capitalize on the opportunities for growth and development 
afforded by globalization while at the same time minimizing the risks.  In an obvious sense this 
means following appropriate policies: stable macroeconomic policies, prudent financial policies, 
and sound regulatory policies.  But appropriate policies are easier to describe than to implement.  
And their specifics are likely to vary over time.  The more fundamental problem is thus how to 
develop institutions with the capacity to determine appropriate policies, implement them, and 
stick to them until circumstances change.    
 
Institutions with this capacity are likely to have the following characteristics.  They combine 
insulation from capture with accountability to their principals.  They facilitate the development 
of a social consensus on goals and instruments and an equitable sharing of the benefits from their 
implementation.  They allow governments to make credible commitments but also provide 
escape clauses designed to allow those commitments to be modified or revoked in the event of 
fundamental changes in circumstance. 
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Globalization also has a dark side.  Capitalizing on globalization thus means preventing its risks 
from disrupting growth and development and from engendering a backlash against open markets.  
This means tailoring policies to contain the heightened risk of crisis and the volatility created by 
the integration and liberalization of financial markets.  It means creating a social safety net to 
support those who are left behind.   
 
To imagine the prospects for developing countries, consider Ireland, an economy that has been 
transformed by globalization.40  In the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Irish growth was 
disappointing (GDP growth averaged 3.7 per cent between 1971 and 1986).  The country was 
widely seen as the sick man of Europe, due to its slow growth, exploding debts, and chronic high 
unemployment.  While per capita incomes, in purchasing power parity terms, were almost the 
same as in Asia’s newly industrializing economies, there was every sign that Ireland was about 
to be left in the dust by the NIEs.  The basis for its subsequent transformation is no secret.  The 
government put in place sustainable macroeconomic and financial policies.  It cut public 
spending, balanced the budget, and pared down the public debt ratio to the levels required by the 
Maastricht Treaty.  It joined the EMS and EMU as a way of creating a bulwark against exchange 
rate and financial instability; it put the crisis problem behind it without resorting to controls or 
other devices that might have discouraged foreign investors.  Tax incentives, a well-educated 
labor force, the reduction of labor-market rigidities, and a commitment to integrate with the 
European Union made Ireland an attractive platform for foreign investors seeking to establish 
production in Europe.  Regional cooperation played a supporting role, with the Structural Funds 
of the European Union financing very considerable investment in and upgrading of the country’s 
infrastructure. 
 
Critically, the country’s literate and numerate labor force, extensive university-industry 
cooperation, market-based financial system, and efficient infrastructure made it attractive for 
international companies to locate in Ireland not just assembly operations, as they did initially, but 
also R&D.  The R&D expenditures of foreign-owned firms, as a percentage of Irish GDP, have 
doubled since 1986 (Barry, Bradley and O’Malley 1999).  And given the nature of R&D 
                                                           
40For more details the interested reader should consult Barry (1999) and Barry and Crafts (1999). 
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spillovers, R&D by international firms did much to stimulate R&D by indigenous producers.   
As a result of these changes, Ireland is now the “tiger” of Europe, with growth accelerating since 
1987 to 6.2 per cent and in the second half of the 1990s reaching levels of ten per cen per annum 
that would be regarded as more than respectable by a Korean economist.  TFP growth, 
meanwhile has doubled from 2 per cent per annum in the first period (where it accounted for 
slightly more than half of GDP growth — in other words, the postwar Japanese pattern) to 4 per 
cent per annum (or nearly two-thirds of GDP growth, the Continental European pattern).41 
 
Developing economies are not Ireland.  Their labor and financial markets are different.  The fact 
that it is member of the European Union sets it apart.  But Ireland is an example of a country that 
was able to alter its policies and institutions to capitalize on globalization.  In this sense it not 
only offers a vision of the challenges but also the opportunities facing the developing economies 
in the global economy of the 21st century. 
 
                                                           
41Calculations are from Nugent (1998-9) for 1971-86 and 1987-97. 
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Table 1 
 
Trends in Global Trade and Investment 
Relative to Global Output 
 
Year Trade as 
Percentage of 
GDP 
Trade as 
Percentage of 
Goods GDP 
Net Inflows of 
FDI as a 
Percentage of 
GDP 
Net Inflows of 
FDI as 
Percentage of 
GDI 
     
1970 28.05 .. 0.48 2.40 
1971 28.18 .. 0.50 2.46 
1972 28.28 .. 0.44 2.13 
1973 30.97 .. 0.55 2.51 
1974 37.26 .. 0.63 2.82 
1975 34.45 .. 0.54 2.51 
1976 35.62 .. 0.40 1.78 
1977 35.63 .. 0.43 1.81 
1978 34.67 .. 0.45 1.85 
1979 37.44 .. 0.54 2.22 
1980 39.96 72.67 0.65 2.75 
1981 40.11 71.08 0.63 2.68 
1982 38.44 69.24 0.44 2.03 
1983 37.82 67.21 0.41 1.91 
1984 39.58 69.69 0.49 2.22 
1985 38.81 68.11 0.50 2.25 
1986 35.56 65.35 0.66 2.97 
1987 36.16 69.10 0.93 4.00 
1988 37.22 71.93 0.97 4.03 
1989 38.42 72.60 1.07 4.47 
1990 38.88 75.99 1.01 4.40 
1991 39.34 76.01 0.69 3.07 
1992 40.21 78.50 0.70 3.18 
1993 39.33 78.73 0.89 4.12 
1994 40.79 82.53 0.93 4.22 
1995 42.90 87.55 1.13 5.06 
1996 43.23 86.14 1.23 5.56 
1997 45.18 92.11 1.57 7.13 
1998 .. .. 2.25 .. 
     
 
Note: FDI stands for foreign direct investment, 
 GDP for gross domestic product, and 
 GDI for gross domestic investment 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, CD Rom. 
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Table 2 
 
Global Exports and  
Imports of Commercial Services 
(in Billions of US$) 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Global Exports 
 
Global Imports 
 
Total Trade 
 
1980 
 
 
364 
 
397 
 
761 
1985 382 396 778 
    
1990 783 812 1595 
    
1995 1188 1188 2375 
    
1997 1322 1291 2613 
    
1998 1332 1314 2645 
    
1999 1350 1345 2695 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2001. Trade Statistics: Historical Series. Geneva. 
 
